In the months before the genocide, Hutu extremists organized in ways that should have provided clear warning to the international community:

• The Interahamwe ("those who attack together") and Impuzamugambi were paramilitary militias trained for mass killing

• Lists of Tutsis and moderate Hutus to be killed were prepared in advance

• Machetes were imported from China and distributed in quantities far exceeding agricultural needs

• Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM, Free Radio of the Thousand Hills) broadcast genocide incitement, naming individuals to be killed and broadcasting their locations

Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian general commanding the small UN peacekeeping force (UNAMIR), warned UN headquarters of preparations for genocide and requested authorization to seize weapons caches. He was denied permission.

The genocide

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana (a Hutu) was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport. Habyarimana was killed. The genocide began within hours. Who shot down the plane is still debated; Hutu extremists used it as a pretext for the genocide they had been preparing.

Over the following 100 days, the Interahamwe and other Hutu militias, joined by ordinary Hutu citizens (many compelled, some willing), killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Most killings were done with machetes and other simple tools. Roadblocks were set up throughout the country to identify and kill Tutsis. People were killed in churches where they had sought refuge, in schools, in homes. Approximately 250,000 to 500,000 women were raped, often after being forced to watch the killing of family members. Children were often killed; some were spared if they could be raised as Hutu.

International failure

The international response was a catastrophic failure. Several aspects deserve attention:

• The UN peacekeeping force was withdrawn rather than reinforced. After 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed in the early hours of the genocide, Belgium withdrew its forces. The Security Council reduced UNAMIR from 2,500 to 270 troops in April 1994, even as the genocide was occurring.
• The United States obstructed action. Burned by the Somalia debacle of 1993 (when 18 American soldiers had been killed in Mogadishu), the Clinton administration was determined to avoid another African military intervention. State Department guidance directed officials to avoid the word genocide because formal recognition would create legal obligations to act.
• France played a complicated role. France had supported the Hutu government for years. French Operation Turquoise (a humanitarian intervention in late June 1994) provided cover for some genocide perpetrators to escape.
• Other major powers were absent. Russia, China, and most other major powers showed no interest in intervening.